Europa: Europe, not just Turkey, must look at changing
Richard Bernstein International Herald Tribune
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 6, 2005
BERLIN Condoleezza Rice's back-room role in brokering the deal in Luxembourg this week that opened formal negotiations on EU membership for Turkey is a reminder both of the real reason for the deal and the reason, barring a miracle, that Turkey will never realize its 40-year-old dream of joining the European club.
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BERLIN Condoleezza Rice's back-room role in brokering the deal in Luxembourg this week that opened formal negotiations on EU membership for Turkey is a reminder both of the real reason for the deal and the reason, barring a miracle, that Turkey will never realize its 40-year-old dream of joining the European club.
The main argument in favor of admitting Turkey is and always has been strategic: to anchor Turkey in Europe and to reduce the risk that it will drift eastward into the enemy camp in the ongoing and future war of civilizations.
Needless to say, strategic objectives have been at the heart of the EU since the beginning, first to prevent war in the heart of Europe, then to prevent it farther afield, even while ensuring broadening respect for democratic norms. But grand geo-strategic visions are the business of political analysts and political leaders, and in this instance they clash directly with the interests, at least as they are perceived, of a majority of people in a majority of the current EU member countries.
Those interests are largely economic and cultural. A democratic, pro-Western Turkey would be nice, European publics are saying, but not if that has to be paid for by unemployment, competition from very cheap labor, and the presence in their countries of millions of Turks who - let's face it - are not Europeans.
It's illuminating in this sense to review how Turkey, rather than, say, Russia or Ukraine or Morocco, became a candidate-member in the first place. The process began in the 1960s, when Greece, Turkey's rival, was first mentioned as a potential member of what was then the European Economic Community, and an accommodating, balancing gesture toward Ankara was deemed a necessity.
At the time Greece was under the colonels and Turkey was a military dictatorship, so few of those who identified both countries as potential future club members really wanted either of them to join.
But Greece became a democracy, and, as one diplomat involved in EU matters over the years put it, "How could you exclude the cradle of European democracy from a united Europe?" And if Greece was to be named an official candidate, it was again deemed necessary to hold open the same prospect for the Turks.
The point is Turkey was never a candidate for membership because it was a natural member of the core European association, like Greece or Spain or Britain. Turkey's candidacy was almost inadvertent, based in large part on the EEC's and then the EU's hesitation to say "no" loudly enough so that everybody would understand. Instead, figuring that a clear "no" would have bad consequences, the EEC and then the EU gave Turkey assurances about its future prospects every time the question of its membership came up, and with each assurance, a clear "no" became ever harder.
"It was like a man who has a girlfriend but doesn't want to marry her, but doesn't want to break up with her, either," the diplomat said.
By now, of course, a loud "no" to Turkey would have awful consequences, a turn to nationalism and Islamism in Turkey just at the moment when the West's strategic imperative is to prevent such moves. That has been averted for now, and the Turks and their stock market seem pleased that formal negotiations will take place. Still, the deep ambivalence in Europe and the method by which Europe has continually made promises to Turkey that in its heart it never really wanted to keep have soured the mood.
As Der Tagesspiegel in Germany put it the day after the diplomatic breakthrough in Luxembourg: "The EU has managed, in the last three years, to convert an enthusiastic fan club," meaning Turkey, "into a disappointed, disillusioned horde of millions who now believe the 'Christian club' wants nothing to do with them."
Certainly, by saying yes to formal accession talks, the EU has bought some time. A lot can happen in 12 years, perhaps a spurt of economic growth in Europe, an end to chronic stagnation and unemployment, so that 70 million poor new members won't be such a frightening prospect. Maybe there will be such a striking transformation of Turkey that Europeans will drop their cultural objections to its membership. But both those possibilities seem unlikely, even given the time span in question.
And in the end, is it at all really conceivable in an EU that will then have 27 members and where new members can only be admitted unanimously, that Turkey will get in?
Probably not. Most likely, some country will exercise a veto, possibly Austria with its memories of the 1683 siege of Vienna, or Cyprus, now that the Greek half of Cyprus, in a colossal mistake, was admitted to EU membership before coming to terms with its Turkish half. Or the French, who will have a national referendum on the matter, will say "no." After all, is it feasible to expect the French, who rejected the EU constitution in part out of a fear of competition from Polish plumbers, to say "yes" to 70 million Muslim Turks, some of whom are also plumbers?
There's a deeper issue here as well. As Jacques Chirac said after the Luxembourg deal earlier this week, Turkey will have to embark on veritably revolutionary changes in culture and politics to become acceptable as a full partner in Europe.
True enough, but what Chirac left out is the notion that there will have to be some pretty deep changes among Europeans, too, if the strategic goal of admitting Turkey into the EU is to be realized: changes in attitude about foreigners, for example, about economic protectionism, about Islam and about competition.
It is certainly true, as Europeans like Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer of Germany have put it, that Turkey's ardent wish to join the EU, and its willingness to Europeanize itself in order to qualify, are among the best examples of diplomatic soft power anybody will ever see. But if the strategic goal of Turkish membership is to be achieved, an equally great revolution in attitudes has to take place inside Europe, and, at this point certainly, despite the jubilation that the Luxembourg agreement produced, that revolution doesn't seem very likely.
E-mail: pagetwo@iht.com
Tomorrow: Roger Cohen on Domin- ique de Villepin and Nicolas Sarkozy.
BERLIN Condoleezza Rice's back-room role in brokering the deal in Luxembourg this week that opened formal negotiations on EU membership for Turkey is a reminder both of the real reason for the deal and the reason, barring a miracle, that Turkey will never realize its 40-year-old dream of joining the European club.
The main argument in favor of admitting Turkey is and always has been strategic: to anchor Turkey in Europe and to reduce the risk that it will drift eastward into the enemy camp in the ongoing and future war of civilizations.
Needless to say, strategic objectives have been at the heart of the EU since the beginning, first to prevent war in the heart of Europe, then to prevent it farther afield, even while ensuring broadening respect for democratic norms. But grand geo-strategic visions are the business of political analysts and political leaders, and in this instance they clash directly with the interests, at least as they are perceived, of a majority of people in a majority of the current EU member countries.
Those interests are largely economic and cultural. A democratic, pro-Western Turkey would be nice, European publics are saying, but not if that has to be paid for by unemployment, competition from very cheap labor, and the presence in their countries of millions of Turks who - let's face it - are not Europeans.
It's illuminating in this sense to review how Turkey, rather than, say, Russia or Ukraine or Morocco, became a candidate-member in the first place. The process began in the 1960s, when Greece, Turkey's rival, was first mentioned as a potential member of what was then the European Economic Community, and an accommodating, balancing gesture toward Ankara was deemed a necessity.
At the time Greece was under the colonels and Turkey was a military dictatorship, so few of those who identified both countries as potential future club members really wanted either of them to join.
But Greece became a democracy, and, as one diplomat involved in EU matters over the years put it, "How could you exclude the cradle of European democracy from a united Europe?" And if Greece was to be named an official candidate, it was again deemed necessary to hold open the same prospect for the Turks.
The point is Turkey was never a candidate for membership because it was a natural member of the core European association, like Greece or Spain or Britain. Turkey's candidacy was almost inadvertent, based in large part on the EEC's and then the EU's hesitation to say "no" loudly enough so that everybody would understand. Instead, figuring that a clear "no" would have bad consequences, the EEC and then the EU gave Turkey assurances about its future prospects every time the question of its membership came up, and with each assurance, a clear "no" became ever harder.
"It was like a man who has a girlfriend but doesn't want to marry her, but doesn't want to break up with her, either," the diplomat said.
By now, of course, a loud "no" to Turkey would have awful consequences, a turn to nationalism and Islamism in Turkey just at the moment when the West's strategic imperative is to prevent such moves. That has been averted for now, and the Turks and their stock market seem pleased that formal negotiations will take place. Still, the deep ambivalence in Europe and the method by which Europe has continually made promises to Turkey that in its heart it never really wanted to keep have soured the mood.
As Der Tagesspiegel in Germany put it the day after the diplomatic breakthrough in Luxembourg: "The EU has managed, in the last three years, to convert an enthusiastic fan club," meaning Turkey, "into a disappointed, disillusioned horde of millions who now believe the 'Christian club' wants nothing to do with them."
Certainly, by saying yes to formal accession talks, the EU has bought some time. A lot can happen in 12 years, perhaps a spurt of economic growth in Europe, an end to chronic stagnation and unemployment, so that 70 million poor new members won't be such a frightening prospect. Maybe there will be such a striking transformation of Turkey that Europeans will drop their cultural objections to its membership. But both those possibilities seem unlikely, even given the time span in question.
And in the end, is it at all really conceivable in an EU that will then have 27 members and where new members can only be admitted unanimously, that Turkey will get in?
Probably not. Most likely, some country will exercise a veto, possibly Austria with its memories of the 1683 siege of Vienna, or Cyprus, now that the Greek half of Cyprus, in a colossal mistake, was admitted to EU membership before coming to terms with its Turkish half. Or the French, who will have a national referendum on the matter, will say "no." After all, is it feasible to expect the French, who rejected the EU constitution in part out of a fear of competition from Polish plumbers, to say "yes" to 70 million Muslim Turks, some of whom are also plumbers?
There's a deeper issue here as well. As Jacques Chirac said after the Luxembourg deal earlier this week, Turkey will have to embark on veritably revolutionary changes in culture and politics to become acceptable as a full partner in Europe.
True enough, but what Chirac left out is the notion that there will have to be some pretty deep changes among Europeans, too, if the strategic goal of admitting Turkey into the EU is to be realized: changes in attitude about foreigners, for example, about economic protectionism, about Islam and about competition.
It is certainly true, as Europeans like Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer of Germany have put it, that Turkey's ardent wish to join the EU, and its willingness to Europeanize itself in order to qualify, are among the best examples of diplomatic soft power anybody will ever see. But if the strategic goal of Turkish membership is to be achieved, an equally great revolution in attitudes has to take place inside Europe, and, at this point certainly, despite the jubilation that the Luxembourg agreement produced, that revolution doesn't seem very likely.
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